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Articles
Special Issue on Circuit Splits

Supervisors in a World of Flat Hierarchies
Catherine L. Fisk*
Under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), employees who are supervisors do
not have the rights to join or assist labor unions or engage in other concerted activities for
mutual aid and protection. The federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) have longstanding disagreements between and among them over how much
authority over what types of working conditions is necessary to render one a supervisor.
Recent cases reach conflicting results over issues such as whether nurses who can report
co-workers for disciplinary infractions or can direct other employees to perform certain
tasks are statutory supervisors who exercise independent judgment. The Supreme Court
has twice rejected the NLRB’s efforts to clarify the law by narrowing the breadth of vague
statutory terms defining supervisors. Because the statutory language invites the meaning
of supervisor to be fact dependent and tethered closely to the policy bases for protecting
employees’ rights to unionize and for excluding supervisors from the protection of those
rights, deference to the Board’s judgment in line drawing is important. As the Supreme
Court prepares to resolve a circuit split over the definition of supervisor under Title VII, it
is particularly important to remember that, although the NLRB and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) have adopted similar tests under the
two different statutes, the policies underlying the legal definition of supervisor are
dramatically different and call for a broad definition of supervisor for Title VII and a
narrow definition of supervisor under the NLRA.

* Chancellor’s Professor, School of Law, University of California, Irvine.
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Introduction
In the contemporary workplace, the definition of which employees
should be deemed supervisors under law is both important and uncertain.
It is important because many employment and labor laws treat supervisors
differently than other employees. Under some statutes, such as the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or the “Act”), supervisors are
1
not protected. Under other statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the actions of a supervisor can create vicarious liability for the
2
employer more readily than the actions of a nonsupervisory employee.
The uncertainty surrounding who meets the legal test for a supervisor
stems both from law and from an evolution in personnel practice. The law
will be explained below. The personnel practices that make the law
interesting and difficult may be familiar to anyone who looks carefully at
the service economy workplace. If you visit a nursing home or many of
the food or retail stores in a huge shopping mall, you’ll find hundreds of
employees but few real managers. A nursing home may have a staff of
100 working in three shifts around the clock. Of those, there will be
perhaps five or ten clear supervisors (the director of nursing, the assistant
director of nursing, and some others). Then there may be forty licensed
practical nurses (“LPNs”), forty nursing assistants, or others who clearly
are not supervisors. Because the clearly supervisory employees are not
on the premises at all times, it is quite possible that at some times there
will be no one around who is clearly a supervisor. When the Director of
Nursing is not on the premises, are all the LPNs and nursing assistants
working without a supervisor? Or are the LPNs all supervisors?
As a legal issue, the question of who is a supervisor is interesting in
a number of circumstances. Under the NLRA, a worker who meets the
statutory definition of “supervisor” does not enjoy the rights to form, join,
or assist labor unions, to bargain collectively over terms of employment, or
3
to engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid and protection. She

1. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2012).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1997).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (defining employee with rights under the NLRA); id. § 157 (defining
rights of employees under the NLRA).
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can be fired for engaging in the kind of activity that the statute protects.
Moreover, if a worker is deemed to be a supervisor, she is not entitled to
vote on whether a workplace should be unionized and, indeed, her
involvement in efforts to form a union may be itself an unfair labor
4
practice or grounds for setting aside an election. Supervisors can join
unions, of course: The powerful Directors Guild of America, which
represents directors, first and second directors, and some other
production supervisors in film and television, is a union—but they must
rely only on market power, and not law, to protect their rights to
5
unionize and bargain.
In a union-organizing campaign, both the employer and the union
have incentives to be strategic about whether to deem particular workers
to be supervisors. For example, if a worker encourages coworkers to
support the union, the employer could later argue that the worker was a
supervisor and that her encouragement constituted unlawful coercion
6
that should invalidate the union’s election win. If a particular employee’s
vote on a union election is crucial to the margin of victory, whoever lost
the election has an incentive to argue that the tie-breaking voter was a
7
supervisor in order to change the outcome. Yet as a general matter,
employers tend to prefer that employees who are arguably supervisors be
declared as such under the NLRA because that way they have fewer
rights against wrongful discharge. And, as a general matter, the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”) tends to find fewer
employees to be supervisors than employers would prefer—perhaps
because of the Board’s perceived pro-labor orientation.
As interpreted by the courts and the NLRB, an employee is a
supervisor under section 2(11) of the NLRA if she exercises authority
(1) to engage in one or more of twelve enumerated supervisory job
functions (including, obviously, the power to hire, fire, discipline, promote
and demote and, less obviously, the power to “assign,” “responsibly to
direct,” or “effectively to recommend” any of the twelve actions); (2) “in
the interest of the employer”; and (3) in a manner that is “not merely . . .
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. J.S. Carambola, LLP, 457 F. App’x 145 (3d Cir. 2012). In J.S. Carambola,
the employer urged that the union election victory should be set aside because an alleged supervisor
urged coworkers to vote for the union. Id. at 147. The NLRB then argued that the employee was not a
supervisor within the meaning of the statute. Id.
5. Directors Guild of Am., 198 N.L.R.B. 707, 725 (1972) (finding the Directors Guild of America
to be a labor organization within the meaning of the NLRA notwithstanding that its members were
supervisors).
6. See, e.g., J.S. Carambola, 457 F. App’x at 147–48. But see NLRB v. Special Touch Home Care
Servs., Inc., 566 F.3d 292, 301–02 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that interrogators of union supporters were
agents of the employer and that the coercive nature of the interrogations made it immaterial whether
they were technically supervisors).
7. See, e.g., Alois Box Co. v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 69, 71–73 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that the union
won a majority of ballots cast by eligible voters in a close union representation election during which
the union and the company were arguing that different employees were supervisors ineligible to vote).
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routine or clerical” but that “requires the use of independent judgment.”
The controversy in the law is not whether this is the test for a supervisor;
the controversy is over the meaning of these three elements. Within and
among the federal courts—and between the courts and the NLRB—there
has been an intensely fact-specific debate over what sorts of circumstances
establish that a particular employee is a statutory supervisor, and
particularly over when an employee exercises enough authority with
enough discretion to be a supervisor. This is a fight over how law should
be applied to facts; it is not really a circuit split in the conventional sense.
Whether an employee is a supervisor also matters under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. When a supervisor engages in harassing or
other discriminatory conduct prohibited by Title VII, the employer will
be liable unless it can establish as an affirmative defense that it had a
reasonable and effective antidiscrimination policy which the victim
9
unreasonably failed to use. But if a nonsupervisory employee engages in
the same behavior, the employer will be liable only if the victim can
prove that the employer was negligent in failing to prevent or stop it; that
is, the employer knew or should have known about the conduct and
10
failed to address it.
The circuits have clearly split on who constitutes a supervisor under
Title VII, with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits having taken a relatively
extreme position that only those who have the actual power to hire, fire,
11
demote, transfer, and discipline workers are supervisors, and other
circuits having accepted the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (“EEOC”) position that a Title VII supervisor includes
one who has the authority to direct another employee’s daily activities,
12
workload, or tasks. The EEOC has issued guidance (it does not have
rulemaking authority under Title VII) providing that an individual is a

8. The statute defines a supervisor as an
individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly
to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
9. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1997).
10. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759, 765.
11. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 470 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 23
(2012). In Vance, the panel, while noting that the law of its circuit is more restrictive than in other
circuits, stated that a supervisor is one “with power to directly affect the terms and conditions of the
plaintiff’s employment,” including “the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an
employee,” but not the power “to direct an employee’s daily activities.” Id. at 470. See generally
EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 684 (8th Cir. 2012); Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp.,
359 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2004).
12. See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122–28 (2d Cir. 2003).
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supervisor if she “has authority to undertake or recommend tangible
employment decisions affecting the employee” or “authority to direct the
13
employee’s daily work activities.” The Supreme Court has taken a case
to resolve this circuit split, but the oral argument revealed the difficulty
of developing a rule that avoids the kind of factual line-drawing
14
problems that have persisted in the NLRA context. The experience of
the federal courts with the frequently litigated issue of supervisory status
under Title VII offers some lessons for courts considering the supervisor
issue under the NLRA.
This Essay was written in response to an invitation from the
Hastings Law Journal to write on the NLRA supervisor question for its
special issue dedicated to circuit splits. Part I addresses the question
whether there is a circuit split on this issue. Part II briefly examines the
evolution of the definition of supervisor under the NLRA and under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although, for reasons given
below, I conclude that there is not really a circuit split on the definition
of supervisor under the NLRA and, to the extent there is, the Supreme
Court is unlikely to resolve it, the question nevertheless merits discussion
in this circuit split symposium. The interesting question for Supreme
Court watchers, it seems to me, is a comparison between the test for
supervisor under the NLRA and the test for supervisor under Title VII.
It is that comparison that I will address in Parts III and IV below. In Part
III, I argue that the designation of supervisor has different legal
significance under Title VII and the NLRA and the policies advanced by
treating supervisors differently than employees are also different. In Part
IV, I argue that if the Court adopts a narrow definition of supervisor
under Title VII in Vance v. Ball State, its decision will likely have little
bearing on the definition of supervisor under the NLRA. The narrow
definition of supervisory status urged by the employer—Ball State—and
its business group amici in the Supreme Court is inconsistent with the
language and purpose of Title VII, just as the broad definition urged by
employers and adopted by the Board is inconsistent with the language
and purpose of the NLRA. In other words, several federal courts have it
exactly backwards. In order to protect employees from workplace
discrimination, a broad range of employees should be supervisors within
the meaning of Title VII. But in order to protect the rights of employees
to bargain collectively, a narrow range of employees should be
supervisors.

13. See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful
Harassment by Supervisors (1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html.
14. See Vance, 646 F.3d at 470.
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I. Is There a Circuit Split?
In 2006, the Board decided a trio of cases articulating a new
15
approach to defining supervisors. Since then, while some panels of some
courts of appeals have rejected NLRB determinations about supervisory
status on particular facts, the law on the formulation of the three-part
test for a supervisor under the NLRA has appeared to have settled. Only
two of the three parts of the NLRA test for supervisor are seriously
contested in any case—whether the employee possesses supervisory
authority and whether she uses independent judgment in exercising that
authority. The third element—that the employee exercise supervisory
authority in the “interest of the employer”—is generally met in every
case because it is rare that a putative supervisory employee’s activities
are not undertaken in the interest of the employer, at least as the
16
Supreme Court has defined the terms since 1994.
For the first prong—whether the employee possesses one of the
twelve enumerated types of authority—the major points of controversy
have been over (a) whether an employee has the power to “assign”
another to do tasks; (b) whether an employee has the power “responsibly
to direct” others; and (c) what to do with employees who sometimes have
17
the power to assign and direct and sometimes do not. To assign means to
designate an employee to a place or time (such as a shift assignment) or to
18
give significant overall duties. A supervisor “responsibly directs” another
19
if the supervisor will be held accountable for the other’s performance.
“An individual who is ‘engaged part of the time as a supervisor and the
rest of the time as a unit employee’ will be considered a supervisor if she
spends ‘a regular and substantial portion’ of her work time performing
20
supervisor functions.” A “regular” part of time means “according to a
21
pattern or schedule, as opposed to sporadic substitution.”
For the second prong—whether the authority involves the kind of
discretion that requires “independent judgment” or whether it is “merely
15. See Golden Crest Healthcare Ctr., 348 N.L.R.B. 727 (2006); Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B.
717 (2006); Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006).
16. In the 1980s, as professionals in the healthcare fields began joining unions, the Board began to
emphasize the significance of the “interest of the employer” prong in order to distinguish between
employees who exercised authority to direct others because of professional norms or licensing
requirements and those who exercised such authority because their employer had delegated personnel
powers to them. See Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of Professional and Supervisory
Status: Fertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle?, in Labor Law Stories 353, 366–68 (Laura Cooper &
Catherine Fisk eds., 2005). The Supreme Court rejected the Board’s interpretation of the “in the interest
of the employer” prong in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
17. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt et al., Labor Law in the Contemporary Workplace 180–81 (2009).
18. Golden Crest Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. 727; Croft Metals, 348 N.L.R.B. 717; Oakwood
Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. 686.
19. Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 17, at 180–81.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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routine or clerical” (such as the power one employee has to ask another
to do something and to report her for discipline if her request is ignored
or refused)—the controversy has primarily involved the degree of power,
discretion, and judgment an employee is permitted to exercise when
asking a coworker to do something. Under the Board’s 2006 rule,
independent judgment is determined by the degree of discretion, not the
22
kind of discretion.
The question whether there is a split among the circuits on the
NLRA supervisor is complicated by the fact that the circuits are
supposed to grant deference to the decisions of the NLRB. The NLRA
vests responsibility in the NLRB to interpret and enforce the statute
23
both through rulemaking and through adjudication. Like many other
federal agencies created during the New Deal and since, NLRB
adjudication decisions are subject to judicial review by either a party filing
a petition for review in a federal court of appeal or by the agency seeking
24
enforcement of its order (NLRB orders are not self-enforcing). The
courts of appeals review NLRB decisions under the well-established
substantial evidence standard applicable to most administrative agency
adjudications. The court is to uphold the agency’s interpretation of the
statute if it is reasonable and the agency’s findings of fact and its decision
based on those findings are supported by “substantial evidence on the
25
record considered as a whole.” The Supreme Court often says that
courts should grant deference to the Board and to give the Board “a
degree of legal leeway when it interprets its governing statute,
particularly where Congress likely intended an understanding of labor
26
relations to guide the Act’s application.” On the other hand, the
Supreme Court at times ignores the Board’s interpretation of the very
same sections of the Act, even where it might seem that the Board’s
27
expertise in labor relations might be implicated.

22. See Oakwood, 348 N.L.R.B. at 692–93.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). Unlike many other administrative agencies, the NLRB rarely exercises
its rulemaking power; it has chosen to exercise its quasi-legislative power to interpret the statute
mainly by deciding particular cases.
24. Id. § 160(e).
25. Id.; see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (describing the substantial
evidence standard).
26. See NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 89–90, 95–98 (1995) (upholding the
Board’s interpretation of the definition of employee covered by the Act in a case involving the
question of whether union organizers are employees); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891
(1984) (upholding the Board’s interpretation of the definition of employee covered by the Act in
deciding whether undocumented workers are employees).
27. See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 721–22 (2001) (rejecting the Board’s
interpretation of the scope of the supervisor exception); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539–
41 (1992) (rejecting the Board’s decision that union organizers have rights to communicate with
employees on company premises because, in the majority’s view, the statute unambiguously does not
provide such rights).
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In every circuit but the Fourth, at least one decision has upheld the
Board’s determination of supervisory status as supported by substantial
evidence since 1997, and most circuit courts of appeals have affirmed the
28
Board on this issue since 2005. While there is no obvious circuit split,
there remains inconsistency within circuits about when panels will find
Board determinations of nonsupervisory status to be supported by
29
substantial evidence. If one digs deeply into the facts of particular cases,
one can find inconsistencies, both within and among circuits and between
the Board and some circuits about when an employee’s authority to ask
another to do something makes her a supervisor. For example, one D.C.
Circuit decision upheld the Board’s determination that registered nurses in
a nursing home were not supervisors, notwithstanding that they could
“write up” coworkers and provide “performance evaluations” of them,
because they “had no negative effects on the reviewed employees’ job
30
status or pay.” In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Board’s
determination that LPNs in a nursing home were not supervisors, finding
that the authority of the LPNs to fill out “coaching forms” was not “merely
31
reportorial,” and therefore the LPNs were supervisors.

28. See Frenchtown Acquisition Co. v. NLRB, 683 F.3d 298, 316 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding the
Board’s determination that charge nurses were not supervisors); Rochelle Waste Disposal, L.L.C. v.
NLRB, 673 F.3d 587, 589 (7th Cir. 2012) (upholding the Board’s determination that a “landfill
supervisor” was not a supervisor); 735 Putnam Pike Operations, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 474 F. App’x 782,
782–83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding the Board’s determination that RNs and charge nurses were not
supervisors); Mars Home for Youth v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 850, 853–54 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding the
Board’s determination that resident assistants were not supervisors); NLRB v. Saint Mary Home,
358 F. App’x 255, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the Board’s determination that charge nurses were
not supervisors); Dynasteel Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.3d 253, 257–58 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding the
Board’s determination that a maintenance employee was not supervisor); NLRB v. St. Clair Die
Casting, 423 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding the Board’s determination that set-up specialists
were not supervisors); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. NLRB, 405 F.3d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005)
(upholding the Board’s determination that public utility revenue protection workers were not
supervisors); Cooper/T. Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 1259, 1260 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding the
Board’s determination that docking pilots were not supervisors); NLRB v. Hilliard Dev. Corp., 187
F.3d 133, 147–48 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding the Board’s determination that district and charge nurses
were not supervisors); Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding the Board’s determination that RNs employed as charge nurses were not supervisors).
29. In contrast to the cases cited supra in note 28, several cases have rejected Board determinations
of supervisory status. See Lakeland Health Care Assocs., L.L.C. v. NLRB, 696 F.3d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir.
2012) (rejecting the Board’s determination that LPNs were not supervisors); Jochims v. NLRB, 480 F.3d
1161, 1163–64 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the Board’s determination that an RN was a supervisor);
Extendicare Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F. App’x 412, 413 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the Board’s
determination that floor nurses were not supervisors); Glenmark Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333,
334–35 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the Board’s determination that RNs and LPNs were not supervisors);
Schnuck Mkts. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 700, 703–07 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the Board’s determination that
an employee was a supervisor). Typically, these cases and those upholding Board determinations of
supervisory status either do not cite cases from the same circuit reaching the opposite conclusion about
whether to uphold the Board or simply distinguish the other case on the facts.
30. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, 474 F. App’x at 783.
31. Lakeland Health Care Assocs., 696 F.3d at 1340.
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If the crucial element of being a supervisor is the power to choose
whether to report misconduct that may lead to discipline against another
worker, in many bureaucratic workplaces, a large number of employees
are possibly supervisors. A Sixth Circuit opinion rejecting the Board’s
determination that nurses were not supervisors illustrates the
possibilities. The issue was whether the nurses were supervisors because
32
they could initiate a disciplinary process by “writing up” coworkers. The
court of appeals explained:
The nurses decide independently whether a nursing assistant’s
misconduct is severe enough to warrant disciplinary proceedings. . . .
. . . [A] floor nurse’s completion of a disciplinary action report initiates
formal disciplinary proceedings against a nursing assistant. By making
such a report, therefore, a nurse plays an effective part in the
33
disciplinary process.

Many employees work in environments in which they are encouraged
or allowed to report misconduct by coworkers. Employees always have a
choice about whether to make a report, and most are probably
encouraged to exercise judgment in deciding whether the misconduct is
sufficiently serious or occurs often enough to be worth reporting. In most
workplaces with such a process, the making of such a report is the first
step in a process that can result in discipline, at least if the person who
reviews the report decides to do something about it. This gives the Board
and reviewing courts latitude to emphasize some facts over others in
deeming a worker a supervisor. When a court disagrees with the Board’s
decision, it is often “difficult to discern whether the circuit court has
applied a different standard for § 2(11) status, or merely decided that the
Board’s factfinding was unsupported by substantial evidence, the standard
34
for appellate review.”
The challenge is discerning when an employee who has the power to
ask another to perform a task has the power to “assign” or “responsibly to
direct” and therefore is a supervisor. The Board explained the problem
this way:
[I]f a charge nurse designates an LPN to be the person who will
regularly administer medications to a patient or a group of patients, the
giving of that overall duty to the LPN is an assignment. On the other
hand, the charge nurse’s ordering an LPN to immediately give a
sedative to a particular patient does not constitute an assignment. In
sum, to “assign” for purposes of Section 2(11) refers to the charge
nurse’s designation of significant overall duties to an employee, not to
the charge nurse’s
ad hoc instruction that the employee perform a
35
discrete task.

32.
33.
34.
35.

See Extendicare Health Servs., 182 F. App’x at 416–17.
Id. at 417.
Weiss, supra note 16, at 365.
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 689 (2006).
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A similar problem exists in deciding when an employee’s authority
“responsibly to direct” makes her a supervisor. In its 2006 Oakwood
Healthcare decision, the Board held that “responsible” direction exists
only when the putative supervisor will herself face discipline or other
adverse consequences if the employee refuses to perform the directed
36
task or performs it poorly.
Finally, on the “independent judgment” prong, the Board had to
revise the approach it had taken that the Supreme Court rejected in
Kentucky River. In that case, the Board had held that a staff nurse’s
authority to direct less-skilled coworkers such as LPNs, technicians, and
nursing assistants to perform tasks did not make her a supervisor if the
only judgment she exercised in exerting her authority was dictating by
professional training (what any responsible nurse would do) rather than
37
from power delegated by her employer. In Kentucky River, the
38
Supreme Court rejected this approach as lacking any statutory basis. So
the Board in Oakwood revised its approach, concluding that “judgment
is not independent if it is dictated or controlled by detailed instructions,
whether set forth in company policies or rules, the verbal instructions of
a higher authority, or in the provisions of a collective-bargaining
39
agreement.” In applying this standard to the health setting, the Board
offered the example that “a decision to staff a shift with a certain number
of nurses would not involve independent judgment if it is determined by
40
a fixed nurse-to-patient ratio.”
In the late 1990s, some perceived a circuit split to exist on the degree
of deference that courts of appeals should afford NLRB determinations of
supervisory status. All agree on the test, that the standard of review is
substantial evidence, and that the Supreme Court settled in 2001 that the
41
burden is on the party asserting an employee is a supervisor to prove it.
The Eighth Circuit in 1992 said that careful scrutiny of the Board’s
42
determination of supervisory status was appropriate, and the Fourth
Circuit has similarly insisted that “courts must carefully scrutinize the
Board’s finding and the record on supervisory status” because “manifest”
inconsistency in how the Board applies the test has displayed
an institutional or policy bias on the part of the Board’s employees as
illustrated by a practice of adopting that definition of supervisor that
most widens the coverage of the Act, the definition that maximizes

36. Id. at 695.
37. See generally NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
38. See id. at 714.
39. 348 N.L.R.B. at 693.
40. Id.
41. See Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 711.
42. Schnuck Mkts. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 700, 703–07 (8th Cir. 1992) (overturning the Board’s
finding that an employee was a supervisor).
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both the number of unfair labor practice findings it makes and the
43
number of unions it certifies.

In contrast, the Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have insisted on the
importance of deference to the Board’s expertise in weighing relevant
44
facts and making determinations of supervisory status. Yet the Eighth
Circuit has upheld the Board’s determination of supervisory status,
stating that whether “a particular employee is a supervisor is a factual
question within the Board’s special expertise, and its findings regarding
supervisory status will be upheld as long as they are supported by
45
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.”

II. Historical Overview
As originally enacted, the NLRA did not exempt supervisors. The
statute covered all employees and defined employee broadly and
46
circularly, in § 2(3), as “any employee.” In 1947, the Supreme Court
held that supervisors were included in the definition of “employee” as
47
used in section 2(3) of the NLRA. Congress amended the NLRA that
same year, adding § 2(11) to specifically exclude supervisors from the
48
Act’s definition of “employee.” According to the Board’s recent
account of the history and evolution of the supervisor exclusion, the
drafters of the supervisor exclusion
agreed that the definition sought to distinguish two classes of workers:
true supervisors vested with “genuine management prerogatives,” and
employees such as “straw bosses, lead men, and set-up men” who are
protected by the Act even though they perform “minor supervisory
duties.” Thus, the dividing line between these two classes of workers,
for purposes of Section 2(11), is whether the putative supervisor
49
exercises “genuine management prerogatives.”

The evolution of the Board’s interpretation of the § 2(11) exclusion
and its reception in the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court
50
has been traced quite ably by others, so I do not repeat it here. The

43. Glenmark Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting NLRB v. St. Mary’s Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1982)).
44. See Alois Box Co. v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 69, 71–73 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding the Board’s
determination that a maintenance man was a supervisor); Cooper/T. Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d
1259, 1260, 1262 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting the circuit split and upholding the Board’s determination
that docking pilots were not supervisors); Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 550
(9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Board’s determination that RNs employed as charge nurses were not
supervisors).
45. NLRB v. St. Clair Die Casting, L.L.C., 423 F.3d 843, 848–49 (8th Cir. 2005).
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935).
47. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488–92 (1947).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2012).
49. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 687–88 (2006) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1974)).
50. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 16, at 353.
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significant point, for present purposes is this: The distinction has
mattered a great deal in the healthcare context, and particularly in longterm care facilities where union-organizing activities have been vigorous,
employer opposition has been equally vigorous, and the Board has taken
various approaches to crafting a rule that allows a significant number of
staff nurses to retain the right to unionize notwithstanding the fact that
the job of a nurse does involve some authority to direct less-skilled
workers to perform particular tasks.
The Supreme Court twice rejected as unreasonable the NLRB’s
interpretation of the § 2(11) test for supervisor, both in cases involving
whether nurses working in nursing homes were supervisors. In 1994 it
rejected how the Board analyzed the “in the interest of the employer”
51
prong, and in 2001 it rejected the Board’s approach to the “independent
52
judgment” prong. Both were 5–4 decisions that split along the
conservative-liberal line that so often divides the Court, and a
conservative majority in both rejected a Board rule that would have
found comparatively fewer employees to be supervisors than under the
53
rule advocated by business groups in both cases. The Board responded
to the Court’s 2001 rejection of its rule by articulating a new approach in
its 2006 decision in Oakwood Healthcare. Since then, while there are
some differences of opinion between and among circuits and Board
members, the differences of opinion about labor law and policy are
difficult to distinguish from fine-grained factual distinctions about
whether this or that nurse or maintenance employee has the power to tell
coworkers what to do or to report them make an error.
The origins and existence of the circuit split on the definition of
supervisor under Title VII, however, are much clearer. Title VII prohibits
54
discrimination by employers and their “agents.” Until the statute was
read to prohibit sexual harassment in the 1980s, there was rarely the
occasion to litigate who was an agent of the employer because whoever
decided not to hire or promote or to fire or discipline an employee on the
basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin was clearly an agent of the
employer. In claims involving harassment, however, employers raised the
idea that the harasser was acting on his own behalf and was not authorized
by management to engage in this form of discrimination and, therefore,
was not an agent of the employer. In 1998, the Supreme Court held that a

51. See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
52. See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
53. Health Care & Retirement was written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See 511 U.S. at 572. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter. See id. at 584. Kentucky River was written by Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. See 532 U.S. at 707–
08. Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 722.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
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harasser was an “agent” of the employer (and thus the employer was liable
for the harassment) if the harasser was a supervisor such that the
55
harassment was aided “by the existence of the agency relation.” The
Supreme Court explained, “When a fellow employee harasses, the victim
can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to
56
offer such responses to a supervisor.” In that case, the harasser held the
title of “lifeguard captain” and made daily work assignments, but he did
57
not have the authority to hire, fire, promote, or demote the plaintiff.
Because employer liability turns on whether the harasser was a
coworker or a supervisor, employers predictably argued for a rule that
declares relatively fewer workers to be supervisors under Title VII and
limits supervisors to those who hire and fire. In a large company, of
course, that would mean that few outside the ranks of senior management
or the HR office would be supervisors and, therefore, plaintiffs could only
prevail in harassment cases if they could prove the company was negligent
in failing to prevent or stop harassment. Employers got the rule they
wanted in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, but not from the EEOC,
which issued an Enforcement Guidance in 1999 that resembles the
NLRB rule, in declaring supervisors to include those who assign daily
58
tasks and those who recommend personnel actions.

III. How the Split Should Be Resolved
The fundamental question confronting any court or agency deciding
how to define the term “supervisor” is how much authority over what
types of working conditions is necessary to render one a supervisor. On
the surface, the EEOC definition and the NLRB definition are somewhat
similar. Both focus on the existence of actual authority to direct another
employee’s daily activities, workload, or tasks. While the EEOC
definition is appropriate given the policy underlying Title VII to
eliminate discrimination, the test is too broad under the NLRA. In its
most recent decision on the meaning of supervisor under the NLRA, the
Supreme Court recognized that the Board properly relied on evidence
that the 1947 amendment that exempted supervisors was intended to
exempt only “true supervisors” possessing “genuine management
authority” and not “minor supervisors,” and that such a labor policy was
an appropriate one for the Board to pursue “without our constant
59
second-guessing.” The challenge, the Court pointed out, is the statutory
language, which broadly includes anyone who exercises any one of the
twelve enumerated supervisory powers and is not entirely clear about
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998).
Id.
Id. at 781.
See EEOC, supra note 13.
NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 720 (2001).
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when such powers involve “independent judgment” or are “merely
60
routine or clerical.”
If the Court were to return to the NLRA definition of supervisor a
third time, it would likely address the only prong of the test that it has
not yet interpreted: the meaning of the list of the twelve supervisory
functions and, in particular, the meaning of the three most frequently
litigated functions (that is, to “discipline,” to “assign,” and “responsibly
to direct”). To the extent that some panels or some circuits have held
that some employees are supervisors because they have the power to
report coworkers and such reports initiate a disciplinary process if acted
upon by a superior, they have interpreted the statute incorrectly. None of
the enumerated supervisory tasks in § 2(11) include “report” or
61
“evaluate.” A putative supervisor’s power to report a coworker’s conduct
is supervisory under the statute, therefore, only if it is a form of
“discipline.” To read “discipline” to include “report violations that lead to
discipline” would expand the already broad list of supervisory functions to
include a power possessed by almost every employee who works with
another. Moreover, if courts were routinely to conclude that the power
to report is the power to discipline, then courts would also have to give
another look to the “independent judgment” prong because the
reporting in some of the cases could be characterized as “routine or
clerical.” The same would be true of giving a broad interpretation to
“assign” and “responsibly direct.” The more that those terms encompass,
the more analytic work of distinguishing supervisors from others will be
done by a single prong of the test: the independent judgment prong. Line
drawing will not disappear, but it will focus on the meaning of
independent judgment.
To the extent that the circuit split is not about the meaning of the
statute but is, instead, about the degree of deference courts should give
the Board’s reading of the statute or its application in particular cases,
there is even less to be gained from Supreme Court review. There is no
basis in the statute or in the Supreme Court’s cases on judicial review of
administrative agency action to support the Fourth Circuit’s view that
courts should carefully scrutinize agency decisions on supervisor status
because Board staff or Members have displayed ideological bias. The
alleged ideological bias is simply the Board’s policy judgment that the
language and purpose of the Act require the Board to interpret the
vague supervisory exclusion narrowly in order that employees enjoy the
62
rights to unionize and to be free from retaliation. The voluminous
60. Id. at 710.
61. The twelve supervisory tasks are “to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2012).
62. Glenmark Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting NLRB v. St. Mary’s
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literature on judicial review of agency action and the Supreme Court’s
and federal appeals courts’ well-known difficulties in maintaining a
consistent approach to deference when they strenuously disagree with
the agency’s policy judgments show that the NLRB is certainly not alone
among federal agencies in finding hostility to its policy judgments to be
barely hidden in reviewing courts’ determinations that its decisions are
unsupported by substantial evidence or inconsistent with the enabling
63
act.
Although I would prefer that the Board adopt a rule finding fewer
workers to be supervisors than under its current rule, the decision is the
Board’s to make. If the Board were to revisit its definition, however, the
question is whether the supervisor definition it adopts for the NLRA
should be the same or different from the one that determines employer
liability for harassment under Title VII. Beyond the question of whether
there are advantages of having the same definition under both statutes,
there is a choice between a relatively narrower definition and a relatively
broader one, and under both statutes there is some choice between a rule
that is more fact dependent and one that is less so, which may be easier
to apply but may be either under or overbroad.
Do different policies underlie the legal distinction between employee
and supervisor in the two statutes, and should those push the law in
different directions? The designation of “supervisor” has quite different
legal significance under the two statutes, and the policies advanced by
treating supervisors differently are also different. Supervisors are exempt
from the protections of the NLRA because Congress decided employers
needed to count on their undivided loyalty, and allowing supervisors to
join a union with their subordinates would hamper the employer’s ability
64
to implement personnel policy. An employer is presumptively liable
(subject to an affirmative defense) for harassment committed only by
supervisors because the Supreme Court decided that a victim can walk
away from a coworker’s harassment, but the authority an employer

Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1982)). See generally Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 419 (2009) (arguing for a deferential standard of judicial
review of agency rulemaking on the grounds that searching review standards, such as the D.C. Circuit’s
“hard look” rule, encourage politicization of judicial review by enabling judges appointed by presidents of
one party to invalidate agency actions taken during presidents from the other party).
63. See generally Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 355 (2012)
(surveying the literature on judicial review of agency action and proposing a new method that will
grant appropriate deference).
64. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). The Court held that faculty are exempt from
NLRA protection by a judicially created “managerial” employee exception for the same reasons that
supervisors are exempt: “To ensure that employees who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of
the employer will not divide their loyalty between employer and union.” Id. at 686–88.
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confers on supervisors enables them to perpetrate harassment and thus
65
aids in the commission of the wrong.
The purpose of excluding supervisors from the right to unionize is to
ensure the undivided loyalty of those who make and enforce personnel
policy. That policy should inform the scope of the supervisor exception.
Experience with allowing low-level, quasi-supervisory employees in unions
suggests that conflicting loyalties are not a problem. Such workers are not
excluded from the rights to unionize and bargain collectively under the
66
Railway Labor Act, which governs railroads and airlines. Nor are
67
supervisors excluded under many state public sector labor relations acts.
And, of course, Hollywood has muddled along since the 1930s with
unionized directors, even on productions where the director is also the
writer and is therefore simultaneously a unionized supervisor and a
unionized employee, or where the same person is a producer, showrunner,
and a writer and is therefore simultaneously a supervisor not eligible to be
in an NLRB-certified union and a unionized employee. This experience is
some empirical evidence for the proposition that a narrower definition of
“supervisor” is appropriate under the NLRA because it does not pose the
conflicts of interest that the exclusion seeks to avoid.
As to whether a fact-based test that turns on the particular
circumstances in each workplace (the rule articulated by the NLRB and
the EEOC) is preferable to a bright-line rule that may be either underor over-inclusive in particular circumstances, there are good arguments
that clarity and ease of application are to be preferred, so long as the rule
does not undermine other statutory values. A clear and predictable rule
is better than a confusing and unpredictable one, at least as long as it is a
good rule. At the oral argument in Vance v. Ball State, some of the
conservative members of the Court, especially Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, pressed on the advantages of a simple rule like the Seventh
Circuit’s which would not require courts to sort through the facts in
68
“countless cases.” In considering whether one worker’s power to assign
another to a particular task could be used to harass another on the basis of
a protected trait, the Justices peppered the lawyers with many hypothetical
questions to explore the difficulties of deciding who is a supervisor. Is a
kitchen worker a supervisor, queried Justice Breyer, because she can order
69
a subordinate to chop onions all day? To take an example from the
65. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998).
66. The Railway Labor Act includes “employees or subordinate officials.” 45 U.S.C. § 181 (2012).
See Dorsey v. United Parcel Serv., 195 F.3d 814, 817–18 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that assistant chief
pilots were “subordinate officials”); Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 24 N.M.B. 256, 260–62 (1997) (finding
that in-flight supervisors were subordinate officials).
67. See Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 17, at 183.
68. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–23, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011)
(question of Chief Justice Roberts posed to Deputy Solicitor General Srinivasan).
69. Id. at 14–15 (question of Justice Alito to counsel for Petitioner Vance).
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NLRA, is a nursing home LPN a supervisor because she has authority to
70
fill out a form reporting the misconduct of coworkers?
But a bad, clear rule is worse than a good, complex rule. Under the
NLRA, because the power to “assign” makes one a supervisor, so long as
the power requires “independent judgment” rather than being “merely
routine or clerical,” clarity will be difficult to achieve. Moreover, because
the NLRA includes in its definition those who can “effectively
recommend” any of the twelve enumerated personnel actions, it
necessarily invites an inquiry into the supervisory status of one who cannot
herself discipline or assign others but who can “effectively recommend” it.
If clarity could be achieved, it would be achieved only by making the rule
grossly overbroad. The definition of supervisor would be clear if it
included one with the power to “effectively recommend” any assignment.
To take Justice Breyer’s example, one who can order another to chop
onions, as opposed to green peppers, all day would be a supervisor, at
least so long as it requires “independent judgment” to choose between
chopping one vegetable or another, or between chopping and peeling.
So, presumably, would be a LPN who could allow another to leave early,
or—to use the Sixth Circuit’s example—a Wal-Mart cashier who could
get another cashier in trouble by reporting her failure to treat a customer
with respect. This would create clarity but at the expense of the rights of
millions of employees to unionize.

IV. Why the Supreme Court Should (Not) Resolve It
Given that the Supreme Court has twice rejected the Board’s
previous rules defining who is a supervisor under the NLRA, there is no
reason to believe that if it took another case it would achieve the clarity
and consistency that have so far eluded the courts on this issue. The
disagreements within and among circuit courts—about whether the
nurses at this or that nursing home who can write up coworkers are
supervisors who are exercising “independent judgment” or are merely
reporting—are not the stuff of which Supreme Court decisions are made.
While, as noted above, it would be nice if it were possible to develop a
bright-line rule that would give clarity to the law and predictability to
employers and unions, the Court rejected the Board’s two prior efforts to
clarify the scope of the supervisory exception by narrowing the breadth
of the “independent judgment” and the “interest of employer” prongs.
All that is left is the prong that lists the twelve supervisory functions. The
language of § 2(11)—especially the “assign,” “responsibly direct,” and
“effectively recommend” provisions—does not lend itself to narrow
bright-line rules. While it would conceivably be possible to adopt a

70. See Lakeland Health Care Assocs., L.L.C. v. NLRB, 696 F.3d 1332, 1336–43 (11th Cir. 2012);
see also Extendicare Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F. App’x 412, 416–17 (6th Cir. 2006).
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bright-line rule that renders anyone who makes any assignment a
supervisor, such a rule would be inconsistent with the statutory purpose
of excluding only true supervisors from the right to unionize. So,
unfortunately, we are left with a rule that turns on the facts.
If the oral argument is any guide to the likely outcome in Vance, it
appears that five of the Justices are troubled by the EEOC’s rule which
focuses on the power to assign just like the NLRB’s rule does. They were
troubled by the difficulty of deciding, in the many different settings in
which people work and the many different types of personnel practices
that exist, whether the ability of one worker to direct another and
thereby to change her working conditions renders her a supervisor whose
harassment creates company liability. The Court may be leaning toward
adopting the Seventh Circuit’s narrow definition of supervisors precisely
because many of them seemed troubled by the fact-dependent nature of
the EEOC rule. Justice Kennedy said little but suggested at the end that
one approach might be to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s rule but to add
71
some unspecified increased employer obligation to prevent harassment.
If they want clarity and they don’t mind limiting vicarious liability
(subject to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense) to a narrow category
of cases in which the harassers are those who actually hire, fire,
discipline, and promote, the Court can do so because the supervisor rule
is the Court’s own invention, and it is not hampered by statutory
language that includes as supervisors those who “assign” and “direct”
others.

Conclusion
Whatever the Supreme Court decides about the definition of
“supervisor” under Title VII will have no immediate impact on the
definition of supervisor under the NLRA. Although the definition used
by the EEOC is similar to that used by the NLRB, particularly in its
focus on a supervisor being one who has the power to assign or direct the
daily activities of others, the Court may reject the EEOC rule in favor of
a narrower rule adopted by the Seventh Circuit, which holds that only
those who hire, fire, discipline, and promote are supervisors.
If the Supreme Court rejects the EEOC’s definition of supervisor
under Title VII in favor of a narrower bright-line rule, it will create a
world in which the same employee may be a supervisor under the NLRA
(and thus without rights) and not a supervisor under Title VII (and thus
someone whose harassment of coworkers is not unlawful). Employee
advocates will deplore that outcome as a matter of labor and
employment policy, but there is no legal reason why both statutes must
have the same definition of supervisor.
71. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 53–54.

